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ABSTRACT 
Coexistence of Strategic Vertical Separation and Integration 
by Jos Jansen* 
This paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream 
firms, while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric 
model. A vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the 
strategic benefit of writing a (two-part tariff, exclusive dealership) contract with its 
retailer. Equilibrium coexistence emerges when observable and non-renegotiable 
contracts are offered to downstream Cournot oligopolists that supply close substitutes. 
The scope for equilibrium coexistence diminishes when assumptions on contract 
observability and commitment are relaxed. 
 
JEL Codes. L22, L42 
Keywords: vertical oligopoly, contract costs, strategic substitutes 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Koexistenz von strategischer vertikaler Trennung und Integration 
In der Arbeit werden die Bedingungen identifiziert, unter denen im Gleichgewicht eines 
symmetrischen Modells einige, in der Produktionskette vorgelagerte Firmen vertikale 
Trennung wählen, während andere sich für vertikale Integration entscheiden. Ein 
vertikal getrenntes Unternehmen wägt die fixen Vertragskosten gegen den strategischen 
Vorteil eines Vertrages (mit gespaltenem Tarif und exklusiven Vertriebsrechten) mit 
dem nachgelagerten Einzelhändler ab. Die Koexistenz der beiden Organisationsformen 
im Gleichgewicht entsteht, wenn den nachgelagerten Cournot-Oligopolisten, die fast 
perfekte Substitute produzieren, beobachtbare und nicht nachverhandelbare Verträge 
angeboten werden. Die Koexistenz der Organisationsformen im Gleichgewicht tritt 
weniger häufig auf, wenn die Annahmen bezüglich der Beobachtbarkeit der Verträge 
und der Möglichkeit sich zu binden, gelockert werden. 
 
                                                 
*  I am grateful to Sanjeev Goyal, Johan Lagerlöf, and Reiner Nitsche for helpful discussions and 
comments. Comments from participants of the EARIE 2000 conference are gratefully 
acknowledged. All errors are mine. 
1 Introduction
The strategic advantages of delegation are well-known. Examples of strate-
gic delegation can be found in papers on delegation within the Þrm (e.g.
see Fershtman, 1985, Sklivas, 1987, and Vickers, 1985), vertical structure of
distribution channels (e.g. see Bonanno and Vickers, 1988, Coughlan and
Wernerfelt, 1989, and Gal-Or, 1990), and bargaining (e.g. see Jones, 1989).1
Delegation does not only oﬀer strategic advantages, it comes at a cost. The
existence of information asymmetries, transaction costs, and opportunism
between principal and agent makes delegation costly, as Williamson (1975)
observes. A delegation decision therefore trades oﬀ the strategic advantages
of delegation against its costs.
Most literature on strategic contracts within distribution channels focuses
on vertical duopolies, and on symmetric vertical market structures resulting
from symmetric models. In the real world, however, we often see the co-
existence of vertically integrated and separated distribution channels. In
this paper we give conditions under which asymmetric equilibrium market
structures result from a symmetric model. In other words, we answer the fol-
lowing question: Under what conditions do strategic vertical integration and
separation coexist in equilibrium? In particular, these conditions are on the
nature of downstream market competition, and the observability of retailing
contracts.
Gal-Or (1990) analyzes this problem with Þnal good Bertrand competi-
tion. To countervail the strategic advantage of vertical separation, Gal-Or
introduces a Þxed cost for a vertically separating upstream Þrm of writing a
contract. Despite the cost of vertical separation, the analysis of Gal-Or does
not result in coexistence of vertical separation and integration in equilibrium.
The aim of this paper is to show that in a symmetric model with Þnal good
Cournot competition strategic vertical separation and integration can coexist
in equilibrium.
We focus attention on strategic incentives to vertically separate or inte-
grate. To obtain a clear trade-oﬀ of strategic incentives and contract costs,
1For recent surveys on the literature of strategic delegation, see e.g. Caillaud and Rey
(1994), or Gal-Or (1997).
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we abstract completely from vertical externalities among vertically separated
Þrms. If vertical externalities were present, then the incentive to internalize
them would bias the results towards vertical integration. In general verti-
cal integration internalizes at least two vertical externalities among Þrms.
First, there is the well-known vertical externality of double-marginalization
with linear pricing contracts between upstream and downstream Þrms. Sec-
ond, the vertical externality of foreclosure is due to intra-brand competition
among two retailers that supply a Þnal good from the same upstream Þrm.
We eliminate these vertical externalities by imposing three vertical restraints
on the relationship between upstream and downstream Þrms. First, we allow
for non-linear pricing between upstream and downstream Þrms. A two-part
tariﬀ contract, consisting of a per-unit wholesale price and Þxed franchise
fee, internalizes the double-marginalization externality among vertically sep-
arated Þrms. Second, we assume that Þrms write exclusive dealing contracts
to eliminate the foreclosure externality. Under exclusive dealership contracts
assign one unique downstream supplier to each upstream Þrm. The third
vertical restraint is a royalty scheme, which makes contractual payments in a
distribution channel a function of the quantities of Þnal goods that retailers
supply to consumers. A royalty scheme makes the implementation of two-
part tariﬀ and exclusive dealership contracts possible. With a royalty scheme
contracts with wholesale prices below marginal costs can be proÞtably set,
while exclusive dealership can be enforced.
Although these vertical restraints are exogenous to our model, the liter-
ature suggests that such restraints are chosen in equilibrium. For example,
Gal-Or (1991) shows that if Þnal goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, Þrms
prefer two-part tariﬀs over linear prices and resale price maintenance in equi-
librium. Salinger (1988) shows that, with Þnal good Cournot competition,
a vertically integrated Þrm prefers not to supply to an second downstream
Þrm. Furthermore, Lin (1990) shows that, in the absence of intra-brand com-
petition, exclusive dealing is chosen by Þrms in equilibrium for both linear
and two-part tariﬀ pricing contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model.
Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium vertical structures with observable strate-
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gic contracts between upstream and downstream Þrms. The assumptions
concerning observability of contracts are discussed in section 4 of this paper.
Section 5 concludes the paper. The proofs of propositions are relegated to
the Appendix.
2 The Model
Our model is identical to that in Gal-Or (1990), except for the assumption
that retailers set quantities in the Þnal good market. We consider an industry
with N (where N ≥ 2) upstream Þrms, U1, .., UN , and many potential down-
stream Þrms with reservation payoﬀ 0. Because there are many potential
downstream Þrms, the upstream Þrms have all bargaining power, and make
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to downstream Þrms. That is, we focus attention on
forward vertical integration. We assume that the industry is organized as
N independent distribution channels. The downstream Þrms transform one
unit of the upstream Þrms intermediate good into one unit of Þnal good at
zero cost.
The game has three stages. In the Þrst stage of the game upstream Þrms
simultaneously choose whether to vertically integrate or separate. We make
the following assumptions on vertical integration. One upstream Þrm can
be vertically integrated with one downstream Þrm only. An integrated Þrm
neither oﬀers nor accepts contracts from other channels. Vertical integration
resolves all conßicts of interest within the distribution channel.
Without loss of generality we assume that only the Þrst m upstream
Þrms chose to separate vertically, i.e. Þrms U1, .., Um separate while Þrms
Um+1, .., UN integrate vertically, with m ∈ {0, .., N}. In stage 2 of the game
each vertically separating upstream Þrm Ui oﬀers an exclusive dealership
contract to downstream Þrm Di, with i = 1, ..,m. The upstream Þrm bears a
Þxed cost F > 0 for oﬀering the contract to the downstream Þrm.2 Firm Uis
contract speciÞes a per-unit wholesale price, wi, and Þxed franchise fee, fi,
for i = 1, ..,m. Denote (wm, fm) = ((w1, f1), .., (wm, fm)). We assume that
all contracts are observable, and not secretly renegotiable. The intermediate
2This revenue loss could be due to e.g. ineﬃcient bargaining or information asymme-
tries.
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goods are supplied by all Þrms to the downstream Þrms at no cost at the end
of stage 2.
In the third stage of the game downstream Þrms simultaneously choose
the quantities of the Þnal good they supply to consumers. We assume that Þ-
nal goods are symmetrically diﬀerentiated, where consumers inverse demand
is linear in quantities. Final product is demand is as follows:
Pi(q) = α − qi − δQ−i,
with α > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], and Q−i =
P
j 6=i qj. We interpret parameter δ as
the degree of product diﬀerentiation between Þnal products. For δ = 1
downstream Þrms supply homogeneous goods, while for δ = 0 downstream
Þrms supply to independent markets.
Finally payoﬀs are realized. Given contract (wi, fi), vertically separated
upstream and downstream Þrms receive the following proÞts, respectively:
πUi(q) = wiqi + fi − F , and
πDi(q) = (Pi(q)− wi) qi − fi, for i = 1, ..,m.
A vertically integrated Þrm receives the following proÞts:
πi(q) = Pi(q)qi, for i = m+ 1, ..,N.
We solve the game for pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs).
3 Basic Results
In this section we give conditions under which our symmetric model results
in coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration in SPE. The
Þrst subsection describes the SPEs of the Þnal two stages of the game, by
deriving equilibrium Þnal good quantities and contracts. The second subsec-
tion describes the SPE in the Þrst stage, and gives conditions for coexistence
of vertical integration and separation in SPE.
3.1 Equilibrium in Retailing and Contracting
In stage 3 of the game Þrms set Þnal good quantities. Suppose that m
distribution channels are vertically separated with contracts (wm, fm), while
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N − m channels are vertically integrated, with m = 0, 1, ..,N . DeÞne the
function v(wm,m) as follows:
v(wm,m) =
(2− δ)α+ δPmk=1wk
(2− δ)[2 + (N − 1)δ] .
The equilibrium Þnal good quantities, prices and proÞts are summarized in
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Given m = 0, 1, .., N and contracts (wm, fm), the Þnal good mar-
ket equilibrium is as follows.
(VS) For i = 1, ..,m:
q∗i (w
m,m) = P ∗i (w
m,m)− wi = v(wm,m)− wi
2− δ ,
π∗Ui(.) = wiq
∗
i (.) + fi − F , and π∗Di(.) = (P ∗i (.)− wi) q∗i (.)− fi.
(VI) For i = m+ 1, .., N :
q∗i (w
m,m) = P ∗i (w
m,m) = v(wm,m), and π∗i (w
m,m) = v(wm,m)2.
Downstream Þrms reaction functions are downward sloping in the total quan-
tity of the Þrms competitors. An increase in a distribution channels whole-
sale price is similar to an increase of its downstream Þrms marginal cost.
Therefore the vertically separated downstream Þrms reaction function shifts
inward, which makes it a less aggressive Cournot competitor. Therefore each
Þrms equilibrium Þnal good quantity is increasing in its competitors whole-
sale prices. Each vertically separated Þrms equilibrium Þnal good quantity
is decreasing in its own wholesale price. Equilibrium Þnal good prices are
increasing in wholesale prices. Hence each distribution channels equilibrium
proÞt is increasing in a competitor channels wholesale price, while it is de-
creasing in its own wholesale price.
In stage 2 of the game each vertically separated upstream Þrm Ui chooses
its contract (wi, fi), with i = 1, ..,m. It is immediate that the franchise
fee is set such that it fully extracts the distribution channels anticipated
equilibrium proÞts. Since each distribution channels equilibrium proÞt is
decreasing in the channels wholesale price, the upstream Þrms decrease their
wholesale prices below marginal cost (i.e. below zero). The equilibrium
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wholesale price trades oﬀ the marginal beneÞt of the Þnal good price increase
against the marginal cost due to the decrease of equilibrium Þnal good
quantities. The equilibrium marginal wholesale price is as stated in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2 Given m = 0, 1, .., N , and i = 1, ..,m, Þrm Uis SPE contract
(w∗i , f
∗
i ) is such that: f
∗
i (m) = (P
∗
i (w
∗,m)− w∗i ) q∗i (w∗,m), and
w∗i (m) =
−δ2(2− δ)(N − 1)α
2[2 + (N − 2)δ][2− δ + (N − 1)δ(1− δ)] + δ3(N − 1)(m− 1) ≤ 0.
Note that the equilibrium wholesale price is indeed non-positive, and sym-
metric due to the symmetry of our model. This is commonly observed in the
literature on strategic delegation with strategic substitutes. Furthermore,
the wholesale price increases in the number of vertically separated Þrms m,
for δ > 0.
3.2 Equilibrium Coexistence
In stage 1 of the game upstream Þrms choose whether to vertically integrate
or separate. In other words, the SPE m is determined. When we substitute
the SPE contract in the upstream Þrms revenue functions we obtain the
following revenues of vertical integration and separation, respectively:
πV I(m) = v(w∗,m)2, and
πV S(m) =
µ
v(w∗,m) +
1− δ
2− δw
∗
¶µ
v(w∗,m)− 1
2− δw
∗
¶
.
DeÞne the following function:
H(m) ≡ πV S(m+ 1)− πV I(m).
For simplicity we introduce the tie-breaking rule that makes a Þrm choose for
vertical integration whenever it is indiﬀerent between vertical integration and
separation. Equilibrium conditions for symmetric vertical structures with all
Þrms vertically integrated or separated are, respectively:
πV S(1)− πV I(0) ≤ F , or H(0) ≤ F for m∗ = 0, and
πV S(N)− πV I(N − 1) > F , or H(N − 1) > F for m∗ = N .
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It is straightforward that we can always obtain a symmetric vertical industry
structure in SPE. Since H(0) is Þnite, we can always Þnd a contract cost
F that exceeds it. Such a high contract cost prevents Þrms from writing
contracts, and consequently all Þrms vertically integrate in SPE. If contracts
are costless, i.e. F = 0, each Þrms will vertically separate in SPE, since this
gives Þrms a strategic advantage at zero cost. The condition for obtaining
an asymmetric vertical structure in SPE, with m∗ vertically separating Þrms
(m∗ = 1, .., N − 1) is: H(m∗) ≤ F < H(m∗ − 1). Note that this condition
can only be met if H(m) is decreasing in m. This is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 There is always a contract cost such that a symmetric ver-
tical oligopoly in SPE exists. In particular, if H(.) increases monotonically
in m, then two symmetric SPEs exist for intermediate contract costs: full
vertical integration (m∗ = 0) and full vertical separation (m∗ = N). If H(.)
decreases monotonically in m, then the SPE m is unique, and neither full
vertical integration (m∗ = 0) nor full vertical separation (m∗ = N) is chosen
in SPE for intermediate contract costs.
Most literature focuses on strategic delegation eﬀects in a duopolistic
setting. The following proposition conÞrms that the literatures focus on
symmetric vertical structures is consistent with our results.
Proposition 2 (Duopoly) For a duopolistic industry, N = 2, there is no
contracting cost such that vertical separation and integration coexist in SPE.
When we combine propositions 1 and 2, we obtain the following for vertical
duopolies. If contracting costs are low, i.e. F < H(0), all Þrms separate
vertically in a unique SPE, i.e. m∗ = N , since the precommitment eﬀect
dominates the cost of writing a contract. For high contracting cost, i.e.
F ≥ H(1), both upstream Þrms choose to integrate vertically in a unique
SPE, i.e. m∗ = 0, since the contracting costs outweigh the precommitment
beneÞts. Intermediate contracting costs, H(0) ≤ F < H(1), result in a
duplicity of SPEs, with full vertical integration in one, and full vertical sep-
aration in the other equilibrium. This result conÞrms that the main focus
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of the literature, on vertical duopolies with symmetric equilibrium market
structures, is consistent with our results. However, in the remainder of this
section we show that this consistency breaks down when there are more than
two distribution channels in the industry.
In an oligopoly with more than two Þrms symmetric vertical structures
need no longer be the only equilibrium outcomes, as we show in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 (Oligopoly) For an oligopolistic industry, with N ≥ 3,
there are degrees of product diﬀerentiation δ(N) and δ(N), with 0 < δ(N) ≤
δ(N) < 1, such that:
(i) for all δ ≥ δ(N) and any m∗ ∈ {1, .., N − 1} there is a contracting cost
such that m∗ Þrms separate while N −m∗ Þrms integrate vertically in SPE,
(ii) for all δ ≤ δ(N) there is no contracting cost such that vertical separa-
tion and integration coexist in SPE. In particular, all Þrms remain vertically
integrated in SPE.
Part (i) of the proposition results from the fact that for suﬃciently substi-
tutable Þnal goods the marginal beneÞt of vertical separation is decreasing in
the number of vertically separating Þrms. Therefore the SPE number of ver-
tically separating Þrms is unique, as follows from proposition 1, and supports
coexistence for intermediate contracting costs, i.e. H(N − 1) ≤ F < H(0).
In particular for H(m∗) ≤ F < H(m∗ − 1) the unique SPE number of ver-
tically separating Þrms is m∗, for all m∗ ∈ {1, .., N − 1}. In part (ii) of the
proposition the retailers supply to approximately independent markets. In
that case vertical separation loses its strategic impact on competing distri-
bution channels. The Þxed cost F of writing such a nonstrategic contract
discourages upstream Þrms from separating vertically. Therefore all Þrms
remain vertically integrated in SPE.
The proposition shows that the negative result of Gal-Or (1990) for strate-
gic complements does not carry over to a model with strategic substitutes. In
a vertical oligopoly where retailers supply close substitutes equilibrium coex-
istence of vertical separation and integration is possible. This result implies
that the main conclusions in the strategic delegation literature on symmetric
vertical duopolies need not carry over to vertical oligopolies.
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4 Discussion
Recently the importance of contract observability and secret contract rene-
gotiation on the precomitment eﬀect of delegation received considerable at-
tention in the literature. In this section we discuss the eﬀects of relaxing our
assumptions on the observability and renegotiability of Þrms contracts.
An inßuential paper on the precommitment eﬀects of unobservable con-
tracts is Katz (1991). The paper shows that the strategic eﬀect of verti-
cal separation vanishes in the rational-agent equilibrium of our delegation
game when contracts are unobservable. Recently Fershtman and Kalai (1997)
show that this negative conclusion need not hold if the more conventional re-
Þnement of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is used. Furthermore Katzs
negative results need not be robust to the introduction of a small probabil-
ity that contracts become observable, or to repeating the delegation game
several times. These results restore the trade-oﬀ between the strategic ad-
vantage and transaction cost of vertical separation. Finding the conditions
under which this trade-oﬀ results in equilibrium coexistence awaits future
research.
Even if contracts are observable, but can be secretly renegotiated, the pre-
commitment eﬀect of retail contracts disappears, as Caillaud et al. (1995)
show. Upstream Þrms will therefore integrate vertically in equilibrium to
avoid the contract costs. This strong negative result need however not hold
after we slightly change the model. Caillaud et al. (1995) claim that if up-
stream and downstream Þrms are asymmetrically informed about marginal
Þnal good production costs and compete in quantities, renegotiable contracts
create a precommitment eﬀect. This restores the trade-oﬀ between the pre-
commitment eﬀect and the costs of writing a contract. Whether coexistence
of vertical separation and integration result from this trade-oﬀ in equilibrium,
needs to be explored in future research. A positive side eﬀect of performing
such an exercise is that it endogenizes the costs of writing a contract. After
the introduction of asymmetric information, the contracting costs are sim-
ply the expected informational rents that a separating upstream Þrm leaves
the downstream Þrm to make the contract compatible with the downstream
Þrms incentives.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we showed that the existence of asymmetric vertical industry
structures in equilibrium depends on the interaction of retailers in the Þnal
good market. When oligopoly retailers supply closely substitutable Þnal good
quantities, equilibrium coexistence of vertical separation and integration is
possible. However, when the retailers are Cournot duopolists or when Þnal
goods are supplied to independent markets, vertical separation and integra-
tion does not coexist in equilibrium. Gal-Or (1990) shows that with Bertrand
competition in the Þnal good market equilibrium coexistence never occurs.
Although the scope for coexistence diminishes when contracts are unob-
servable or secretly renegotiable, the literature suggests that the trade-oﬀ
between precommitment eﬀects and contract costs remains after the intro-
duction of asymmetric information between upstream and downstream Þrms.
Whether coexistence actually occurs in equilibrium after these changes to the
model, needs to be addressed in future research.
Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs of the papers lemmas and propositions.
¥ Proof of Lemma 1: We characterize the Þnal good supply equilibrium,
givenN−m vertically integrated Þrms, andm vertically separated Þrms with
wholesale prices wm = (w1, .., wm). If we ignore corner solutions, the reaction
functions for the vertically integrated and separated Þrms are, respectively:
eqi(Q−i;wm,m) = ½ 12 (α − δQ−i − wi) , for i = 1, ..,m, and1
2
(α − δQ−i) , for i = m+ 1, .., N ,
Summing over i = 1, .., N gives the following:
Q∗ =
NX
i=1
eqi(Q−i;wm,m) = 1
2
Ã
Nα− (N − 1)δQ∗ −
mX
i=1
wi
!
,
or
Q∗ =
Nα−Pmi=1wi
2 + (N − 1)δ .
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After substituting this expression in the Þrms reaction functions, we obtain
the equilibrium Þnal good quantities, prices, and proÞts of lemma 1.
¥Proof of Lemma 2: In stage 2 the vertically separating Þrm Ui chooses its
two-part tariﬀ contract such that it maximizes its proÞt, given downstream
Þrm Dis participation constraint, and contracts chosen by others, for i =
1, ..,m. If we focus on interior solutions, Þrm Uis contracting problem is as
follows:
max
(wi,fi)
{wiq∗i (wm;m) + fi − F}
s.t. (P ∗i (w
m,m)− wi) q∗i (wm,m)− fi ≥ 0.
It is obvious that the franchise fee is optimally set such that all the down-
stream Þrms proÞt is extracted:
f ∗i = (P
∗
i (w
m,m)− wi) q∗i (wm,m),
which reduces the upstream Þrm Uis optimization problem to (i = 1, ..,m):
max
wi
{P ∗i (wm,m)q∗i (wm,m)− F} , or
max
wi
½µ
v(wm,m) +
1− δ
2− δwi
¶µ
v(wm,m)− 1
2− δwi
¶
− F
¾
.
Firm Uis reaction function for wholesale price wi is as follows:
ewi(w−i;m) = −δ2(N − 1)
³
(2− δ)α+ δPk 6=iwk´
2[2 + (N − 2)δ][2− δ + (N − 1)δ(1− δ)] , for m = 1, ..,N.
After recognizing that the symmetry of the model gives symmetric SPE
wholesale prices, this immediately gives the equilibrium wholesale price of
lemma 2.3
¥ Proof of Proposition 1 (Symmetric vertical structures): To obtain
full vertical separation, choose contract cost F = 0, such that F < H(N−1) is
satisÞed since H(N −1) obviously exceeds zero. For full vertical integration,
observe that H(0) is clearly Þnite, and subsequently choose contract cost
3Note that the SPE contracts and proÞts are such that our focus on interior solutions
in the proofs of this and the previous lemma is not problematic.
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F ≥ H(0). When H(.) is increasing inm, H(0) < H(N−1) holds. Therefore
inequalities F < H(N − 1) and F ≥ H(0) are satisÞed for the same F , iﬀ
H(0) ≤ F < H(N − 1), and both full vertical separation and integration
are SPE strategies. When H(.) is decreasing in m, H(0) > H(N − 1) holds.
Therefore inequalities F < H(N − 1) and F ≥ H(0) cannot be satisÞed
for the same F , and for H(N − 1) ≤ F < H(0) no symmetric vertical
oligopoly exists in SPE. Monotonicity ofH(.) implies that intervals [0, H(N−
1)), [H(N − 1), H(N − 2)), .., [H(1), H(0)), [H(0),∞) do not overlap, which
implies uniqueness of the SPE m. This proves proposition 1.
¥ Proof of Proposition 2 (Duopoly): For a duopolistic industry vertical
separation and integration do not coexist in equilibrium, since for N = 2:
H(1)−H(0) = αδ
6
¡
32 + 16δ − 24δ2 − 12δ3 + δ4¢
16(2 + δ)2(2− δ)2(4− 2δ − δ2)2 ≥ 0, ∀α, δ.
This proves proposition 2.
¥ Proof of Proposition 3 (Oligopoly):
(i) Homogeneous final goods: For an oligopolistic industry (N ≥ 3)
with homogeneous Þnal goods (δ = 1), coexistence of vertical separation and
integration is possible in equilibrium, since for δ = 1:
H(m+ 1)−H(m) =
−α(N − 1)2K
[(m+ 1)(N − 1) + 2]2[(m+ 2)(N − 1) + 2]2[(m+ 3)(N − 1) + 2]2 ,
with
K ≡ 2m3(N − 1)3 + 3m2(N − 1)2(3N − 1) + 12mN(N − 1)2 + 5N 3 − 13N2 −N + 1.
Note that 5N3 − 13N2 −N + 1 > 0 for N ≥ 3, which implies that:
H(m+ 1)−H(m) > 0 for all m, if δ = 1 and N ≥ 3.
Since the inequality is strict and H(m + 1) − H(m) is continuous in δ, we
conclude that there is a critical value δ(N) < 1 such that for all δ ≥ δ(N )
the inequality holds for all m. This proves proposition 3 (i).
(ii) Independent final good markets: For δ = 0 a separating Þrms SPE
13
wholesale price equals zero, w∗i (m) = 0 for all m. SPE revenues of vertically
integrating and separating Þrms therefore equal, and since F > 0 the unique
SPE is one in which all Þrms remain vertically integrated, m∗ = 0. The
existence of a positive critical value δ(N) follows directly from continuity of
the upstream Þrms proÞt function and strict positivity of the contract cost
F . This completes the proof of proposition 3.
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